On this page
Ask whether an electronic signature holds up in Guinea and you get three kinds of answer: a vendor’s yes, a sceptic’s no, and a lawyer’s it depends. All three skip the useful part, which is that the texts are short, public, and say something quite specific.
Two articles of the Code civil speak to it directly, and a 2016 statute speaks to it too. Here are the two articles, and here is what they do.
Where the rules live
As reported by secondary sources, the Code civil in force is Loi L/2019/035/AN of 4 July 2019, promulgated by Décret D/2019/222/PRG/SGG of 26 July 2019, and articles 1002 and 1003 are new in it: the code it replaced, from 1983, said nothing about electronic writing, because in 1983 there was nothing to say. We have not read that text in the Journal Officiel. The wording quoted below is as secondary sources reproduce it; the text in force is to be confirmed against the Journal Officiel before anyone relies on it.
Where they sit matters as much as what they say. They are in the law of evidence. They are not a licensing regime and they do not appoint anyone to approve a product. They answer one question: when an electronic document is put in front of a judge, what is it worth?
Article 1002: electronic writing counts the same
Article 1002 : L’écrit électronique a la même force probante que l’écrit sur support papier, sous réserve que puisse être dûment identifiée la personne dont il émane et qu’il soit établi et conservé dans des conditions de nature à en garantir l’intégrité.
In English: electronic writing has the same evidential weight as writing on paper, provided the person it comes from can be duly identified, and it is created and kept in conditions that guarantee its integrity.
“La même force probante” — the same evidential weight. Not a lesser weight, not a supporting one. No discount for being electronic.
“Sous réserve que” — subject to. The equality is conditional, and there are exactly two conditions. The article names no technology, no format, no vendor, no certificate. Anything that delivers identification and integrity is inside the rule; anything that does not is outside it, however expensive it was.
Article 1003: what a signature is for
Article 1003 : La signature nécessaire à la perfection d’un acte juridique identifie son auteur. Elle manifeste son consentement aux obligations qui découlent de cet acte. Quand elle est apposée par un officier public, elle confère l’authenticité à l’acte. Lorsqu’elle est électronique, elle consiste en l’usage d’un procédé fiable d’identification garantissant son lien avec l’acte auquel elle s’attache. La fiabilité de ce procédé est présumée, jusqu’à preuve contraire, lorsque la signature électronique est créée, l’identité du signataire assurée et l’intégrité de l’acte garantie, dans des conditions fixées par décret.
Sentence by sentence: a signature identifies its author; it expresses consent to the obligations flowing from the act; affixed by a public officer, it makes the act authentic; when electronic, it consists in the use of a reliable identification process guaranteeing its link to the act it attaches to; and the reliability of that process is presumed, until proof to the contrary, where the signature is created, the signer’s identity assured and the act’s integrity guaranteed, under conditions fixed by decree.
Notice the order. Identification comes first, consent second, and only then the electronic form. Electronic signature is not its own species here. It is the same signature produced by a different means, judged on whether that means reliably identifies the person and stays bound to the document.
What “présumée, jusqu’à preuve contraire” actually does
This is the phrase people quote, and the one most often misread. It is worth being slow about.
A presumption is a rule about who has to prove what. It does not decide the case. It decides who has to open the argument.
Without it. You produce the signed document. The other side says the process was not reliable. You now have to show that it was: the identity check you ran, the seal on the file, the record of what happened and when. That is a winnable argument, and the work of winning it is yours.
With it. You produce the signed document, and its reliability is taken as established. The other side has to show it was not. The same evidence still carries you if the fight goes on, but you are not the one who has to start.
That is the whole effect. It moves a burden and buys you the opening position, which is worth a great deal in a real dispute and is not the same thing as winning.
Two things it is not.
Not a shield. “Jusqu’à preuve contraire” means what it says. Bring proof to the contrary and the presumption falls. A signature that meets the conditions is not unchallengeable. It is believed first.
Not a validity rule. A document does not become valid because a presumption applies, or void because it does not. Article 1002 stands on its own two conditions and mentions no presumption at all.
The six words at the end
“dans des conditions fixées par décret” — under conditions fixed by decree.
The presumption is not self-executing. It is offered on terms, and the article does not write those terms — it points at a separate text that has to say what “created”, “assured” and “guaranteed” concretely require.
Whether that text existed before August 2026 is open. Article 1003 is reported to have been in force since 2019; we have found no implementing decree for it before the one press accounts describe below. Without one, the presumption is on the page and out of reach.
That is a smaller problem than it sounds. A dormant presumption removes an advantage; it does not remove the recognition. Article 1002, as quoted above, refers to no decree, and neither does article 1003’s own description of an electronic signature — a reliable identification process, linked to the act. What a missing decree withholds is the shortcut, not the signature.
So on the Code civil alone, for as long as no decree applies, the honest answer is this: your electronic signature is evidence, and the burden of showing the process was reliable sits with you. Which is a very good reason to keep a signing record capable of doing that job unaided.
There is a second statute
Loi L/2016/035/AN of 28 July 2016 on electronic transactions came first, and anyone reading around this subject will meet it. Its article 21 admits electronic writing as evidence where its author “soit identifiée ou puisse être identifiée” — is identified, or can be identified. Its article 33 defines an electronic signature as “l’usage d’un procédé fiable d’identification”, a phrase article 1003, as quoted above, repeats almost word for word. Its article 3 keeps non-contrary rules of “le Code civil en vigueur”; how the two texts combine for a given document is a question for a Guinean lawyer.
Its article 34 has a presumption too, in its own words: “La fiabilité d’un procédé ou dispositif de signature électronique est présumée jusqu’à preuve du contraire”, on condition that the process or device uses a signature électronique sécurisée made with a secure creation mechanism and that its verification relies on a “certificat qualifié”. Before that, its first paragraph says a signature created by “un dispositif fiable et sécurisé que le signataire peut garder sous contrôle et utilisation exclusifs et qui repose sur un certificat numérique” is “admise ou çonsidérée [sic] comme une signature valable au même titre que la signature manuscrite”, and its last paragraph gives a secure signature linked to a “certificat électronique qualifié” “la même force ou valeur probante” as a handwritten one. We draw no hierarchy between these paragraphs; how they relate is a question for a Guinean lawyer. The conditions for “sécurisée” are left to “un décret du président de la République”. We have not found that decree in the public sources we could consult; whether it exists, and which text it would be, is open.
Two footnotes to it. Beside it sits the ECOWAS Supplementary Act of 16 February 2010 on electronic transactions, which binds Guinea as an ECOWAS member — not the UEMOA instruments that circulate in regional summaries, since Guinea is not in UEMOA. And its article 35 gives a certificate from a provider established outside Guinea the same legal value as a Guinean one “dès lors que”, followed by two bullets: the provider meets this law and its implementing texts; a bilateral or multilateral agreement provides for it. The text puts neither “ou” nor “et” between them, so whether both are needed or one is enough is a question for a Guinean lawyer. Either way, what a certificate is worth where it was issued is a separate question from what it is worth in a Guinean file.
What to do with all of it
Build the file that would win without the presumption. Then a presumption, whenever it applies, is a bonus rather than a dependency.
Identify the signer, and record how. The condition is identification, not the presence of a signature image. The answer to “how do you know it was them” has to be in the file.
Seal the document so a later change is detectable. That is what “des conditions de nature à en garantir l’intégrité” asks for in practice: integrity you can demonstrate, not integrity you assert.
Keep the record with the document. A trail that lives only in a supplier’s dashboard is a trail you can lose.
What happened in August 2026
On 19 August 2026, according to press accounts, a decree implementing article 1003 was announced on national television, reportedly setting the conditions the article refers to.
Everything currently known about it comes from press accounts. It has no published reference number, no released official text, and no entry in the Secretariat General’s decree registry. That is not a reason to dismiss it, and it is a reason not to quote it yet as though it were settled law. The next post goes through what press accounts say it contains, and what remains unknown.
Nothing above depends on it. Whether articles 1002 and 1003 still read as quoted here is to be confirmed against the Journal Officiel.
General information, not legal advice. Whether a particular document meets these conditions is a question for Guinean counsel, and contact reaches a person if you want to talk it through.